











Making the European Commission more accountable? Enhancing input legitimacy and 







The following article looks at several elements of both the current academic and 
public/political debate on how to solve the perceived legitimacy problem of the EU 
supranational component, embodied by the European Commission, by enhancing the input 
legitimacy; and at its criticism. It suggests that a combined approach of politicization and 
legitimacy by effectiveness, efficiency and credibility, represented by the decentralized 
agencies delivering regulatory policies, is underdeveloped in the debate.  
 
 
After the 2009 European Parliament elections, further acceleration of the informal process of 
parliamentarization2 of the European Commission can be expected with regard to the way the 
last European Commission under the leadership of José Barroso was appointed and what role 
the European Parliament played not only in this process but also later when deciding, for 
example, on two important single market directives3. In these clashes, the European 
                                                           
1 Mgr. Věra Řiháčková is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Charles University, Prague and research fellow at the 
Europeum Institute for European Policy. Comments welcomed at vrihackova@europeum.org. 
2 Inclusive to input legitimacy, parliamentarization generally suggests the democratic order at the European level 
should be based strongly on parliamentarism; in this case, it also carries the meaning that tying the Commission 
to the European Parliament by the investiture procedure and by decision-making procedure is gradually taking 
place. See also (Majone, 2002:383) 
3 The committee of the European Parliament voted against the nomination of Rocco Buttiglione a JHA 
Commissioner and his nomination was withdrawn. The European Commission decided to withdraw the directive 
liberalizing port services in November 2005 after the opposition of the European Parliament and of the port 
workers. The Commission proposal of the service directive was watered down by the European Parliament. 
Some (Majone, 2006) see it, especially in the cases of the directives, rather as a “populism” of the European 
Parliament, not as result of political clashes. In this sense it is symptomatic that when asked what he would like 
to be remembered for as an EP President, Mr. Josep Borell answered: “It is a difficult question, but I would like 
to be remembered for the breakthrough in communication. I believe that the European Parliament has made a 
qualitative leap in its capacity to be heard and seen in the media. After the refusal to confirm Mr Buttiglione as 
Commissioner, the services directive, the demonstrations in front of the Parliament when we were deciding on 
the port services directive…our work is starting to be known. The other institutions take us into account, but the 
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Commission proved to be rather politically weak and submitted to the will of the European 
Parliament as well as other actors. Although no new institutional provisions are in place, 
which would accommodate explicitly a tendency towards further Commission’s 
parliamentarization, the informal pressure to change the link between these two institutions is 
perceived by many4. 
 
It has been also clear for some time that the functionalist strategy of promoting spillovers 
from one (economic) sector to another has failed and both the functionalist approach and the 
classic Community method, of which the Commission is the embodiment, are being 
questioned from the legitimacy standpoints. Instead of a steady progress towards a federal 
union, as Jean Monnet and other founding fathers had expected, and with the end of the 
permissive consensus of the member states´ citizens, the European Integration process and EU 
institutions suffer from a lack of legitimacy (often and successfully pointed out by 
Eurosceptics) and no one seems to challenge the assumption that there is a growing gap 
between the elites and the citizens, which is a determinant to the future of EU development; 
the views on democratisation and democracy of the system, however, differs.  
 
The debate on how to solve these problems is under way both in the academic and public 
sphere. The Commission itself tries to answer to those challenges by adopting the “Europe of 
results” approach, of which the proposal to cut the roaming prices can be an example, and by 
enhancing its communication efforts. Both remedies seem unable to deliver the desired 
outcomes due to different reasons. Despite the fact that a “Europe of results”, or an effort to 
increase the output legitimacy5 of the EU, would conform to some proponents of such a 
solution in the public6  as well as, with some reservations, in the academic debate7, it seems 
the Commission is not able to deliver “the results” in satisfying numbers in order to be seen 
by the citizens as legitimate by its effectiveness and efficiency due to the constrains (or 
checks and balances) given by the decision-making process in the EU. In an effort to produce 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
public also knows that we are more than just the proverbial Tower of Babel.” (Borrell: "Where there is no 
argument there is no participation", EP News, December 27, 2006, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/public/story_page/008-1648-352-12-51-901-20061219STO01647-2006-18-
12-2006/default_en.htm) 
4 (Majone, 2006); (Hix, 2006) 
5 Under the output legitimacy, the reasoning by effectiveness and efficiency is understood. Effectiveness means 
the capacity of the political system to achieve the goals and to solve the problems of the citizens; efficiency 
refers to the political system being able to do so at a reasonable cost (Schimmelfennig, 1996:13).  
6 See for example The Economist, “Existential Dreaming, Pro-Europeans have two broad and incompatible 
views about the future of the European Union”, March 24, 2007.  
7 See bellow 
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results and improve the lives of citizens, the Commission also tries to assert its regulatory will 
in numerous (new) areas, which are not only technical by its nature but to a large extent also 
political; the need for democratic control and the Commission’s accountability thus arises 
with enhanced urgency. Lastly, it is not only the Commission that can claim “victory” in case 
a result is achieved, but the other institutions, especially the European Parliament. Until now, 
the enhanced Commission’s communication strategy has not brought about the expected 
results; the citizens can still hardly identify the protagonists of the developments at the 
supranational level or to endorse their policies.  
 
This paper aims at looking at several elements of both the current academic and 
public/political debate on how to solve the perceived legitimacy problem of the EU 
supranational component, embodied by the European Commission, by enhancing the input 
legitimacy, and at the criticism of these arguments. By input legitimacy, the principle that a 
democratic system of government achieves its legitimacy by the way decisions are made (not 
by the efficiency and effectiveness criterion), is understood. The legitimate rule then requires 
governors to be directly empowered and held accountable by the citizens, division of powers 
and the checks and balances to be imposed on executive power (Schimmelfennig, 1996:14). 
At the EU level, as the main remedy to the lack of legitimacy and accountability within this 
framework, politicization is usually suggested. This paper suggests that more attention in the 
debate should be given to the combined approach of politicization and legitimacy by 
effectiveness, efficiency and credibility, represented by decentralized agencies delivering 
regulatory policies in order to tackle the perceived Commission’s legitimacy problem. 
 
Enhancing the legislative powers of the European Parliament, and the parliamentarization of 
the system, had been seen for long-time as a means to face the EU democratic deficit. The 
reality showed the expectations were not met (the citizen’s interest in European elections has 
been declining since 1979) probably due to constraints imposed on the European Parliament 
by the EU political system and especially for perceived lack of efficiency8. Therefore, 
politicization and more competitive politics within EU institutions started gaining ground in 
the debate as the way to tackle the input legitimacy problem. Assigning a significant role to 
the European Parliament in the Commission investiture and the reforms of its electing 
procedure are thus largely seen as opening the door to politics and political competition in the 
                                                           
8 See also (Majone, 2006:6) 
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process of Commission nomination,9 although still limited. Before the Maastricht Treaty was 
adopted, there was no provision on the Commission President’s election; he was appointed as 
the rest of the Commissioners by a unanimity vote in the Council, although the backstage 
deliberations on his nomination took place long before that (the informal practice since Roy 
Jenkins election in 1976). The Maastricht Treaty also harmonized Commission’s term in 
office with that of the European Parliament; the Parliament also got the right to consult the 
selection of the Commission’s president nominee and interpreted this provision as granting 
members of European Parliament the right to vote on the candidate10. Since the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the Commission Presidents have been formally invested by a majority in the European 
Parliament (vote of approval). The Nice Treaty brought about further politicization of the 
election of European Commission President by replacing unanimity voting in the European 
Council by QMV voting, which allowed for an increasing number of nominees. However, the 
system of nominations is still rather consensual with too many actors taking part in it. The 
assumptions that on the basis of the election process reforms (and the hearings of the 
nominees in the European Parliament committees) the Commission shall have the same 
colour as the majority in the European Parliament is still rather feeble, with the case of the 
Barroso Commission considered to be rather a coincidence, although its process of investiture 
showed that a Commissioner cannot take the office against the will of the majority in the 
European Parliament. Also the Commission’s accountability to the European Parliament is 
limited, the European Parliament can only impeach the whole Commission (by two thirds of 
its members) and there is no possibility of a no confidence vote as we know it from the 
member states´ parliaments.  
 
Although according to some, no Treaty change is necessary for further politicization and 
political contest when nominating the Commission,11 we also look briefly at the last 
adjustments (reform) of the European Commission nomination and approval procedure, as 
suggested in the Constitutional Treaty12. It established the Commission President to be elected 
by the European Parliament13 and the results of the European Parliamentary elections to be 
taken into account when nominating a candidate; however, it made the European Council 
obliged to nominate only one candidate for the vote in the European Parliament and the 
                                                           
9 (Majone, 2002); (Hix, 2006) 
10 (Hix, 2006) 
11 (Hix, 2006) 
12 The Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe 
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provision on respecting the elected majority in the European Parliament was in no way 
binding for the European Council when selecting the candidate. On the other hand, the 
Constitutional Treaty envisaged a one month period for the European Council to put forward 
another candidate for the Commission President, had the first one been voted down in the 
European Parliament. The provision was designed to prevent the paralysis of EU institutions 
but also signalled the eventuality that the nominee is not elected is a real possible outcome; 
and this could have been regarded as a further door opening to the politicization of the 
European Commission.     
    
The Academic debate 
 
From debating the democratic deficit, the current academic debate shifted towards the issue of 
politicization14. Meanwhile in the debate on the democratic deficit its proponents argued 
within a framework of democracy reasoning, which tied closely the EU to the nation state 
(Hix, Folesdall), while the opponents (Majone, Moravcsik) denied its existence, arguing 
rather for a credibility crisis from the position that the EU is of a special nature (sui generis 
organization) with depoliticized structure and regulatory purposes, both main camps 
represented in the opened politicisation debate (Hix and Bartolini) are framing their 
arguments, as Magnette15 suggests, within the nation state archetype. Picking up this 
argument one has to ask how and whether it is possible to think out of the nation state box 
when elaborating on politicization at the EU level.   
 
Generally, in the current academic debate, there are those who claim that democratization at 
the EU supranational level is neither possible nor desirable (Gabel)16, those defending the 
position that it is impossible but somehow desirable (Bartolini, Ferrera), those who argue that 
democratization is not only possible but also desirable (Hix) and those who suggest 
democratization is possible but somehow not desirable (Majone, Moravcsik). With the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
13 The Treaty of Nice wording states that the Commission is subjected to the vote of approval by the European 
Parliament. 
14 Paris-based think tank Notre Europe opened the room for the debate on politicization by inviting the leading 
academics to contribute to this issue.  
15 (Magnette, 2006) 
16 For the whole following typology see (Schäffer, 2006). 
 6
exception of the first approach, the positions mentioned above will be tackled here in 
connection to the politicization debate17.   
 
For Hix18, politicization is inherent to the current state of the EU; the number of left-right 
political contestations of the agenda is growing with the gradual shift from the creation of the 
single market to the single market-governance. Further politicization is inevitable and it is not 
necessary to encourage it by further institutional provisions (Treaty change) since what is 
provided for in the existing Treaties, i.e. increased powers of the European Parliament, 
extended QMV voting in the Council and changes of the way the Commission is elected and 
appointed, is sufficient for keeping the tendency to politicize the institutions on course. 
Political contestations already exist in each of the EU institutions (although these are hidden 
in the case of the European Commission). The challenge Hix sees is how to link the political 
positions cross-institutionally in the EU and how to link the citizens´ interest to it. He 
suggests the political stakes have to be increased (by allowing for the majority in the 
European Parliament to set its internal agenda, by opening up the legislative process in the 
Council and enlarging the room for Commission President competition) and the European 
leaders have to commit to more right-left politics to play a role in the EU day to day decision-
making. Besides the ideal set of institutions for political contests, EU has, at the moment, also 
a good system of checks and balances. 
 
In response, Bartolini19 states that although the left-right cleavage exists in the European 
Parliament, with the left-right political contestations in the Council and the Commission it is 
not the case. The EU works as a highly consensual political system. On the issue of cross-
institutional political alliances, he adds that there are continual changes to the composition 
and political orientation of the Council resulting from national elections and, to a lesser extent 
in the Commission; as such the convergence of political majorities in the Commission, 
European Parliament and the Council for a longer time period is unlikely. He refuses injecting 
majoritarianism into the EU system; he argues it cannot bring the desired benefits in terms of 
legitimacy and citizens´ interest. He questions especially Hix´s assumption that European 
parties (political parties in the European Parliament) can be facilitators of politicization in the 
                                                           
17 This debate revolves largely around the policies inclusive to the 1st EU pillar. The debate on abandoning the 
pillar structure and its consequences is avoided here.  
18 (Hix, 2006) 
19 (Bartolini, 2006); Despite his scepticism towards politicization represented by Hix´s position, Bartolini admits 
the change of the debate on the EU’s democratic deficit by placing the accent on its political dimension rather 
than institutional reform is positive (Ricard-Nihoul, 2006). 
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EU20 since they lack the internal ideological coherence, and the introduction of ideological 
debate could fragment them. Also, if the current provisions stay in place, the Commission will 
always be a cross-party coalition rather than a homogeneous majority and to politicize the 
nomination procedure of the Commission President could only risk generating expectations 
that would necessarily be disappointed. Lastly, political contestation also requires open 
political debate (and common public sphere as Habermas21 puts it), which is not present in the 
EU, especially in the Commission and in the Council.  
 
From another standpoint starts the argumentation of Majone22; he sees the increasing level of 
politicization of the EU policy-making is unavoidable since Community competences are 
growing and require more political discretion. Commission’s political responsibilities are 
being emphasized and also the demand for boosting European Parliament competences is 
understandable; however, the politicization brings about the risk of harming the credibility of 
the policies of the EU institutions, especially the Commission, effort to deliver. For Majone, 
effectiveness, efficiency and credibility are crucial and provide legitimacy to the Commission, 
unlike in the case of the European Parliament, which has another mode of legitimization; and 
these two principles should not mix. He sees the EU as the sui generis system (of limited 
competences) and objects to the legitimacy arguments based on an analogy to national 
institutions, which are being imposed on those EU elements, which are legitimate by 
efficiency and effectiveness. On the other hand, he admits that the Commission is not able to 
deliver credible (legitimating) results; it suffers greatly from EU underperformance in the 
economic field, which is crucial for the whole European Integration process and thus feels the 
pressure to change (another factor is the enlargement) and it seems the functional mode of 
legitimacy is not sufficient any more. To focus on the output side (Barroso’s Europe of 
results) is only a short-term solution, instead of proposing politicization as a remedy, Majone 
suggests from an efficiency and effectiveness position some areas and competencies should 
be re-nationalized, a barrier should be put to the continuous expansion of Community 
competences and a clear definition of competences division should be adopted. Suggesting a 
remedy inspired by majoritarian model he considers to be false, since it has never been 
                                                           
20 According to some studies, the attitudes of voters towards the European Integration do not copy the left-right 
division but rather cluster around the new possibilities and increased mobility perceptions versus perceived costs 
to be paid for it. Also the political parties and their representation in the European Parliament cannot carry the 
political message since the parties themselves are more favourable towards the European integration than the 
electorate (Bartolini, 2006). 
21 (Habermas, 1996) 
22 (Majone, 1998); (Majone, 2002); (Majone, 2006) 
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considered a model for the European Community (European Union) and it is not even 
functioning in its pure form in any of the member states, including Great Britain (considered 
as a model of the majoritarian political system).   
 
 
The Public debate 
 
In public and political debate, the issue of European Commission politicization has so far not 
been developed much. In the member states, the political debates revolve mostly around the 
issue of the Commission’s size. The public debate offers a broader spectrum of suggestions. 
Using a simplified division for public and political debate on the input legitimacy proposals, 
the terms “intergovernmental” politicization23 and “federalist” politicization are suggested 
here; an “intergovernmental” politicization is represented mostly by the Eurosceptics who aim 
at watering down the Community method and do not try to solve the dilemma legitimacy vs. 
efficiency, effectiveness and credibility at the supranational level, claiming that democracy 
and legitimacy can be assured only at the nation state level. The representatives of “federalist” 
politicization, on the other hand, try to accommodate democracy and legitimacy at the EU 
supranational level.   
 
In this view, the debate on the Commission’s size, which got a new boost when the 
negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty were under way, and which is embodied in the clash 
of two well-known principles, i.e. “one member state - one commissioner” vs. “small and 
efficient Commission”, can be probably read as follows (even though the link between the 
politicization and the issue of the Commission’s size is not very strong):  The principle “one 
member state – one commissioner” falls into intergovernmental politicization logic since it 
aims at keeping the influence of each member state over this body despite the neutrality of the 
Commission. A “Small and efficient Commission”, on the other hand, follows the logic of 
federalist politicization despite the fact that the proponents of downsizing the Commission 
under the number of the member states reasoned for it by the fact that European Commission 
is an apolitical technocratic body.    
 
                                                           
23 Understood also similarly to consensual interstate democracy (Schimmelfennig, 1996:8). 
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As stated above, the “intergovernmental” politicization is usually represented by Eurosceptics 
and traditionally sovereignty-based Danish Euroscepticism24 can give a good example of this 
reasoning. The proposal of Danish Eurosceptic Jens-Peter Bonde25 argues for members of 
national parliaments to elect members of the European Commission in order to underline the 
sole legitimacy of the nation state institutions. It reads: “Every national parliament should 
elect its own member of the Commission. The Commissioner shall attend the European 
Scrutiny Committees of the national parliament concerned. National parliaments should also 
have the power to dismiss their Commissioner. The President of the Commission shall be 
elected unanimously by the European Council. National parliaments shall decide on the 
annual legislative programme and the Commission shall correspondingly act as a secretariat 
for the Council and the national parliaments.”26 According to this proposal, the members of 
the European Commission would be tied with the majority in the member states´ parliaments 
and thus copy the composition of the Council at any given time, directly accountable to the 
national parliaments and highly political personalities defending the national interests in the 
Commission. Since the “Europe of Democracies”, as Bonde suggests, would be an 
intergovernmental international organisation, the problems with the Community method are 
redundant in this way of reasoning. What would then be the Commission’s role is not 
explained in the proposal.    
 
The federalist politicization is represented here by two proposals. First, by the suggestions 
arising within the political debate, backed by some members of European Parliament and 
voiced mainly by the former president of the European Parliament José María Gil-Robles who 
advocated for European Commission composition and agenda to reflect the will of majority in 
the European Parliament27. European Parliament’s influence would leave a clear print on both 
administrative and legislative activities of the European Commission. Secondly, by the 
proposal tabled within the public debate by a think-tanker Charles Grant from the Centre for 
European Reform28, although his ideas fall somewhere between the suggested division since 
the legitimacy of the Commissioners would come from member states but the Commission 
would act in the EU interest. He suggests in his pamphlet the reform of the institutions is 
crucial for EU revival and presents the idea of a politicized smaller European Commission 
                                                           
24 (Sørensen, 2006) 
25 Elected MEP (since 1979) for June Movement, Danish Eurosceptic party. He suggests establishing a “Europe 
of Democracies” (Bonde, 2002).  
26 (Bonde, 2002) 
27 Parliamentary Commission, see (Majone, 2002:383). 
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with commissioners elected directly by the citizens in the member states for non-renewable 
term. The European Parliament would then select the Commission President and EU foreign 
minister; the Commission President would select the rest of the commissioners and those 
elected but not selected would become (European Parliament) deputies. A part of the 
Commission would be turned into independent agencies, accountable to the European 
Parliament, working on regulatory policies for the Commission in a non-political way, with 
the Commission setting the objectives, drafting laws and analyzing the long term trends.    
  
Charles Grant’s proposal aims at increasing legitimacy of the Commission by the direct 
elections. To counter the argument of the Commissioners promoting the national interests 
when elected directly, he states that this is the case even now, although covertly, and that the 
citizens would start being interested in the EU, which would balance the tendency towards 
having a Commission as the field for national interests contestation. Also the way of the 
Commissioners selection would allow the Commission President, who would be tied with the 
majority in the European Parliament, to select a Commission of a particular political colour. 
However his vision of the Commission reform is open to academic criticism, Grant’s 
futurology deserves attention in the way he connects the input legitimacy though 
politicization with the legitimacy by efficiency, effectiveness and credibility. Despite rejected 
by some (Majone, 2006), the option of regulatory decentralized agencies delivering results, in 
synergy with the (politicized) Commissions political guidance and leadership, should be 
explored further. 
 
Is the politicization a remedy?  
 
The elements of academic and public/political debate mentioned above suggest the pitfalls of 
proposals aiming at enhancing the input legitimacy of the EU institutions, especially of the 
Commission, by way of politicization. Politicizing the Commission would go, according to 
some, against the very logic of the role the institution should play. The Commission is 
depoliticized in order to reduce the conflicts among member states but it also reduces the 
clashes of competing political ideas and the Community method works since the member 
states believe the Commission is neutral (even though it does not have to the case in reality)29.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
28 (Grant, 2007) 
29 The politicization also raises many further questions, which were not dealt with within the above listed 
account, like: if the Commission is legitimated by direct elections, what role will there be for the Council, shall it 
turn into the upper chamber of the European Parliament? Would the national leaders allow for such a 
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If Hix claims that most of the EU regulatory policies have also redistributive consequences, 
he does not suggest any other governance solution but the winner and looser logic of the 
majoritarian principle; and a strong point is made in the academic debate that the classic 
majoritarian system cannot function in the EU. If Majone argues for re-nationalization of 
certain domains, barriers to further competences transfers and horizontal network of national 
regulatory policies´ agencies, he omits the fact that even if the EU regulatory policies follow a 
single purpose, they are usually cross-linked with other EU policies or agendas and thus 
vertical governance interventions are needed30.      
 
Looking just at the EU economic governance, the policies that are not simply technical but 
highly political (free movement of services cannot be separated from the issues of social 
policy, etc.) need to be delivered. Therefore, adoption of EU law should be submitted to 
political contestation and debate, better reflecting EU citizens´ concerns. Such a political 
debate should not take place in the nation states (as it was the case of the French debate on the 
services directive) but at the EU level, especially, in the Commission and in the European 
Parliament.  
 
The politicization of the European Commission is possible under the condition that its powers 
and functions are reorganized. Whereas the college of Commissioners could be highly 
political (directly politically accountable to the European Parliament, for instance), the same 
is not needed for the Commission administrative (rather executive) services, represented by 
some of its DGs and units and by the agencies both regulatory (established by legislators) and 
executive (established by the Commission itself). The Commission as a political body could 
then provide for a policy guideline and deliver strategic and long-term orientations.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
development? If the Commission President is nominated after the contestation between two candidates, he would 
have a mandate but does it mean the winner be appointed on the basis of his programme or rather again on the 
will of the European Council members? Would the public perceive such a mandate as strong enough? Would the 
further parliamentarization, with regard to the diminishing turnout in the EP elections, provide sufficient 
legitimacy to the Commission (and balance its legitimacy by efficiency and credibility)? If breaking the 
consensus-oriented ground of EU decision-making, would the current system of checks and balances be 
sufficient?  
 
30 He suggests that member states are no longer as dependent on central institutions as in the past and can 
coordinate their policies in an information-rich environment themselves. In his opinion, to investigate methods 
other than delegation to supranational institutions by which member states can credibly commit themselves to 
collective action is a solution. (Majone, 2002); (Majone, 2006) 
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There are issues that can be left to apolitical, unbiased and independent authorities. Even 
within the nation states, the role of independent authorities and agencies has increased over 
the last decades (including the central banks designing and implementing monetary policy31). 
Such a process increases the importance of expertise in policy-making. Concurrently, political 
power in various social-economic domains is limited by the impacts of globalized economy 
and the states are often obliged to make compromises with non-state actors and stakeholders 
(interest groups, unions, etc).  
 
One argument for the apolitical status of the Commission is often raised and that is that the 
Commission directly decides on sensitive issues such as mergers, state aids, etc. It is true that 
the competition policy should not be executed by a political body, directly accountable to 
elected representatives. Accountability of such bodies should be based on effectiveness, 
expertise, credibility, transparency and neutrality. Even if the Commission is to be politicized, 
the neutrality of the antitrust rules enforcement has to be ensured. Why not then by the way of 
establishing an independent EU agency32?  
 
In the United States, the competition policy is executed by an independent agency (although 
depending formally on the US government). This agency (Federal Trade Commission) has the 
executive power in the domain, whereas law enforcement of the decisions it takes (in case of 
legal disputes) is provided by the Department of Justice. The same model could apply to the 
EU. An independent agency would run the EU competition policy but the DG Competition of 
the Commission would take care of the decisions law enforcement (with the national courts or 
in the Luxembourg court in case of actions for annulment).  
 
Even though some argue33 that the track record of establishing the decentralized agencies is 
rather poor in the EU (like in the case of EFSA - European Food Safety Authority), the idea of 
a politicized European Commission providing political guidance and working in synergy with 
                                                           
31 (Majone, 2002) 
32 The Commission itself was recently the driving force of certain decentralization of the competition policy. As 
some experts suggest, the problem is that the Commission is preoccupied with its image Vis a Vis the EU 
citizens resulting from perceived lack of legitimacy. This preoccupation can encourage the Commission to prefer 
purely the consumer protection logic over the competition rules (even though these principles are rarely in 
contradiction with each other) and allowing for political concerns to win over competition policy execution; for 
example by allowing for antitrust practices or mergers, advocated by the member states as being of paramount 
political and strategic importance.   
33 (Majone, 2002); (Majone, 2006) 
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decentralized agencies delivering results on regulatory policies, should deserve further 
academic attention.  
 
Conclusion   
 
This paper looked at several elements of both the current academic and public/political debate 
on how to solve the perceived legitimacy problem of the EU supranational component, 
embodied by the European Commission, by enhancing the input legitimacy and at the 
criticism of these arguments. At the EU level, as the main remedy to the lack of legitimacy 
and accountability within this framework, politicization is usually proposed. This paper 
suggests that the idea of a politicized European Commission working in synergy with 
decentralized agencies delivering results on regulatory policies, and thus delivering legitimacy 
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